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How States and Municipalities Can Retain
the Power to Regulate Rail Carrier-Owned
Solid Waste Transfer Facilities in the
Context of the Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v.
Village of Croton-on-Hudson and Buffalo




Historically, municipalities throughout the United States
have exercised the right to control the development and uses of
the land within their geographical boundaries through the use of
zoning and other land use laws.  Towns may set up commercial
districts, residential districts, or require special permits for land
uses for which the land is not zoned, or for which the town would
like to impose restrictions or conditions.  The authority to control
land use allows a municipality to create laws protecting the health
of its residents and the environment.
State and local law, including zoning and land use law, may
be preempted by federal law.  Preemption of state law by federal
law occurs when, “(1) the preemptive intent is ‘explicitly stated in
[a federal] statute’s language or implicitly contained in its struc-
ture and purpose’; (2) state law ‘actually conflicts with federal
law’; or (3) federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field ‘as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it.’ ”1
This comment will focus on the preemption of local land use
regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination
Act of 1995 (ICCTA).  The ICCTA explicitly provides that trans-
portation by rail carriers and the construction and operation of
ancillary facilities fall under the jurisdiction of the Surface Trans-
* The author is a third-year law student at Pace Law School and a member of
the PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW Editorial Board.
1. Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
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portation Board (STB), a federal regulatory agency.2  The alloca-
tion of jurisdiction to the STB of facilities operated by rail carriers
can create conflict when municipalities seek to regulate land use
in local rail yards.  Throughout this comment, the cases of Metro
Enviro Transfer, LLC v. Village of Croton-on-Hudson (“Metro En-
viro Transfer”)3 and Buffalo Southern Railroad, Inc. v. Village of
Croton-on-Hudson (“Buffalo Southern R.R.”)4 will be used to illus-
trate the issues that arise when federal law preempts local regula-
tion of possible environmental hazards.
In Metro Enviro Transfer, the Court of Appeals of New York
upheld the denial of a special permit by the Village of Croton-on-
Hudson to a solid waste transfer facility located in local rail
yards.5  In 1998, the Village Board of Trustees issued a three-year
special permit to Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC allowing for the op-
eration of the transfer station, in accordance with forty-two spe-
cial conditions.6 In 2001, Metro Enviro Transfer sought to renew
the special permit, but the Board voted not to renew based on evi-
dence of repeated and intentional violations of the permit.7  The
court of appeals found that the Board’s decision to refuse to renew
the permit was backed by evidence of the violations, and was not
based upon “generalized opposition”8 to its renewal.  Furthermore,
the court of appeals held that the Village did not have to show
that Metro Enviro Transfer’s violations of the permit resulted in
actual harm, but that the many willful violations were enough to
support the Board’s decision.9
In 2006, the Buffalo Southern Railroad (BSR), a successor to
operations at the solid waste transfer station in the train yards
brought suit against the Village of Croton-on-Hudson in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York.10  BSR sought to enjoin the Village from commencing an em-
inent domain proceeding on the property, but also sought to enjoin
the Village from enforcing local zoning requirements on the prop-
2. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9) (2006).
3. Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC v. Vill. of Croton-on-Hudson, 833 N.E.2d 1210
(N.Y. 2005).
4. Buffalo S. R.R. v. Vill. of Croton-on-Hudson, 434 F. Supp. 2d 241 (S.D.N.Y.
2006).
5. Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC, 833 N.E.2d 1210.
6. Id. at  1211.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1212.
9. Id.
10. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d 241.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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erty.11  The district court held that the ICCTA preempts state and
local regulations that interfere with railroad operations.12  The
holding of Buffalo Southern R.R. leaves the Village facing the
prospect that a rail carrier may decide to use the facility to engage
in solid waste transloading operations under the preemption of
the ICCTA.  The Village no longer has the ability to regulate the
hours of operation of the facility or to monitor the types of waste
being processed and transported through the Village en route to
the site.
The second section of this comment discusses the ICCTA, and
its preemption of state and local law, as interpreted by the Surface
Transportation Board (STB) and the federal courts.  In the third
section, this paper reviews the cases of Metro Enviro Transfer and
Buffalo Southern R.R., which exemplify the conflict that ICCTA
preemption presents for municipalities.  The fourth section of this
paper considers three ways that municipalities may retain some
regulatory control over rail-owned facilities within their geograph-
ical boundaries: through proposed federal amendments to the
ICCTA, by implementing traditional state police powers, and by a
revised, narrower interpretation of the preemption provision of
section 10501 of the ICCTA by the courts.
II. THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION
TERMINATION ACT
Congress passed the ICCTA in 1995, amending the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1978, in an effort “to reform economic regulation
of transportation, and for other purposes.”13 The ICCTA termi-
nated the Interstate Commerce Commission and set up the Sur-
face Transportation Board (STB).14 The STB is an “economic
regulatory agency . . . charged with the fundamental missions of
resolving railroad rate and service disputes and reviewing pro-
posed railroad mergers,”15 and the ICCTA gives the STB exclusive
jurisdiction over:
(1) transportation by rail carriers, and the remedies provided in
this part with respect to rates, classifications, rules (including
11. Id. at 243.
12. Id. at 250.
13. H.R. Rep. No. 104-422, at 1 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 850.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Surface Transportation Board, http://www.stb.dot.gov (last visited Sept. 10,
2008).
3
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car service, interchange, and other operating rules), practices,
routes, services, and facilities of such carriers; and
(2) the construction, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or
discontinuance of spur, industrial, team, switching, or side
tracks, or facilities, even if the tracks are located, or intended to
be located, entirely in one State.16
“Transportation” is defined broadly to include a yard, property or
a facility at which “receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit,
refrigeration, icing, ventilation, storage, handling, and in-
terchange of passengers and property” occur.17  The definition of
“transportation” does not include manufacturing or commercial
activities that take place on railroad-owned property that are not
an integral part of rail service.18  “Rail carrier” is defined as “a
person providing common carrier railroad transportation for
compensation.”19
Courts throughout the country, as well as the STB, have in-
terpreted 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) as preempting local and state zon-
ing and environmental regulations.  As stated above, preemption
of state law by federal law occurs when “(1) the preemptive intent
is ‘explicitly stated in [a federal] statute’s language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose’; (2) state law ‘actually con-
flicts with federal law’; or (3) federal law so thoroughly occupies a
legislative field ‘as to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress left no room for the States to supplement it.’ ”20 In Green
Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, a case concerning a railroad
seeking to construct a facility for the unloading and temporary
storage of bulk salt, bulk cement and other non-bulk items, the
Second Circuit held that a Vermont law requiring a preconstruc-
tion permit was preempted by the ICCTA, stating that “the plain
language of section 10501 reflects clear congressional intent to
preempt state and local regulation of integral rail facilities.”21
16. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2006)
17. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(9) (2006).
18. Railroad-Owned Solid Waste Transload Facilities: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials, 110th Cong. (2007) (state-
ment of Charles D. Nottingham, Chairman, Surface Transp. Bd.).
19. 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5).
20. Green Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
21. Green Mountain R.R. Corp., 404 F.3d 638, 645.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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Other cases in accord include: City of Auburn v. United States,22
Soo Line R. Co. v. City of Minneapolis,23 and Boston and Maine
Corp. v. Town of Ayer.24
Typically, there are three ways in which issues involving the
handling of solid waste at facilities located along rail lines come
before the STB: “(1) proposals to build a new line into a new ser-
vice area; (2) proposals that involve a new carrier or a small Class
III carrier seeking to acquire and operate an existing line; and (3)
the construction of facilities ancillary to already-authorized rail
lines.”25  When there is a proposal to build a new line into an area
or a proposal of a new carrier seeking to operate an existing line,
the railroad must receive a license from the STB.  The railroad
can file an application for authority under 49 U.S.C. § 10901, or it
may seek an exemption under 49 U.S.C. § 10502, which allows the
rail to use an abbreviated procedure to obtain authority, subject to
review after issuance.26
Although the construction of facilities ancillary to already-au-
thorized lines falls under the jurisdiction of the STB under 49
U.S.C. § 10501, construction of these facilities is excepted from the
STB’s licensing authority, under 49 U.S.C. § 10906.  Section
10906 of the Act states that the STB does not have authority over
the construction, acquisition or operation of certain types of tracks
including spur, switching and side tracks.27  Whether or not a sec-
tion of track is a side or spur track has significant ramifications
for the environmental regulation of the site.  If the track is subject
to the exception under 49 U.S.C. § 10906, the STB may still have
jurisdiction over it, preventing a municipality from imposing any
regulation upon the operations.  Because these tracks and facili-
ties are not subject to licensing of the STB, the STB does not have
22. City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1998) (city chal-
lenged STB’s finding of preemption of local environmental laws by ICCTA, in regard
to reopening of rail line).
23. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 38 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (D.Minn. 1998)
(city permitting process for demolition of five buildings at rail yard was preempted by
ICCTA).
24. Boston & Maine Corp. v. Town of Ayer, 191 F. Supp. 2d 257 (D.Mass. 2002)
(town preconstruction permit preempted by ICCTA in case of construction of new fa-
cility for unloading automobiles from rail line).
25. Railroad-Owned Solid Waste Transload Facilities: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials, 110th Cong. (2007) (state-
ment of Charles D. Nottingham, Chairman, Surface Transp. Bd.).
26. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10901, 10502.
27. 49 U.S.C. § 10906.
5
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the authority to conduct formal environmental review or to impose
special environmental conditions on the operations.28
This statutory interpretation results in a situation in which
environmental regulation of certain waste transloading facilities
is only subject to federal environmental statutes and regulations
that do not necessarily take into account the factors important to
different localities.  In his statement in the hearing before the
House Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous
Materials, Charles D. Nottingham, chairman of the STB, pointed
out that not all state and local laws are preempted by the jurisdic-
tion of the STB, just those that interfere or prevent rail transpor-
tation.29  Traditional police powers accorded to local government,
like those used to protect public health and safety (including local
fire, electric and building codes), are not preempted.30
Although the explicit preemption of section 10501(b) of the
ICCTA allows for state and local governments to exert some con-
trol over railroad-owned solid waste transfer facilities, this control
is very limited.  As will be discussed below, using the experience of
the Village of Croton-on-Hudson as an example, the federal pre-
emption of local regulations can leave a community feeling vulner-
able to environmental harms and with concerns for public safety.
III. METRO ENVIRO TRANSFER, LLC V. VILLAGE
OF CROTON-ON-HUDSON AND BUFFALO
SOUTHERN RAILROAD, INC. V. VILLAGE
OF CROTON-ON-HUDSON
In 1997, Metro Enviro Transfer leased a parcel of property
from Greentree Realty, Inc.  The property, located on ten acres in
the Village of Croton-on-Hudson, contains a spur of track, 1600
feet in length, a warehouse facility, storage yards, a one-story of-
fice building, and a parking lot.31  Although the property was
zoned as “L-1,” for light manufacturing uses, since 1984, succes-
sive owners and lessees have been using the property as a waste
transfer station and wood recycling center and each has had to
obtain a special permit from the Village.32  In 1998, Metro Enviro
28. Railroad-Owned Solid Waste Transload Facilities: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials, 110th Cong. (2007) (state-
ment of Charles D. Nottingham, Chairman, Surface Transp. Bd.).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
32. Id. at 244.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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Transfer obtained a permit from the Village containing 42 special
conditions, including capacity limitations, restrictions on the type
of waste allowed in the facility, and requiring training of employ-
ees of the facility.33
During the three-year period in which the permit was in
place, Metro Enviro Transfer exceeded capacity limitations
twenty-six times and accepted prohibited types of waste at least
forty-two times.34 Further violations included “the inadequate
training of facility personnel, insufficient record keeping and inap-
propriate storage of tires on the site.”35
Upon application for a renewal of the permit in 2001, the Vil-
lage Board of Trustees granted over ten temporary extensions and
conducted extensive hearings before finally denying the applica-
tion in January of 2003.36  Metro Enviro Transfer then com-
menced an Article 78 proceeding against the Village, claiming
that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious, as the vio-
lations that occurred did not result in actual harm to the commu-
nity or the environment.37  The supreme court found that the
Board’s decision not to renew the permit was based on “genera-
lized opposition, which remains uncorroborated by any empirical
data.”38  The appellate division reversed the supreme court’s deci-
sion finding that the court had “erroneously substituted its own
judgment for that of the Village.”39  The appellate division dis-
missed Metro Enviro Transfer’s Article 78 proceeding.
The court of appeals affirmed the appellate division’s deci-
sion.  A board maintains discretion in deciding whether to grant a
special use permit, but it may not base its decision on “generalized
community objections.”40  In considering whether to renew Metro
Enviro Transfers permit, the Village Board reviewed extensive ev-
idence of violations and expert opinions, and although there was
no actual harm, the Board found the violations were potentially
harmful.  The court found that “the Board was entitled to conclude
that the history of repeated, willful violations created an unac-
33. Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC, 833 N.E.2d at 1211.
34. Id. at 1211.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Metro Enviro Tranfer, LLC v. Village of Croton-on-Hudson, 777 N.Y.S.2d 170,
171 (App. Div. 2004).
38. Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC, 833 N.E.2d at 1211.
39. Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC, 777 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
40. Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC, 833 N.E.2d at 1212 (citing Twin County Re-
cycling Corp. v. Yevoli, 665 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1997)).
7
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ceptable threat of future injury to health or the environment.”41
As a result of the ruling, Metro Enviro Transfer’s operations on
the property ceased.
Metro Enviro Transfer was a victory for the Village. The com-
munity ended the operations of a company that disregarded the
environmental and health safeguards that the Village had in-
sisted upon in the special permit issued in 1998.
After Metro Enviro Transfer ceased operations at the site, its
lease to the property was taken over by Northeast Interchange
Railway, LLC (NIR).42  In December of 2005, NIR applied for and
was granted permits by the New York State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation and Westchester County for handling of
solid waste and the operation of a waste processing facility on the
property.43  NIR then applied to the STB for a Notice of Exemp-
tion Transaction to operate as a common carrier by rail on the
stretch of track on the property.44  The STB reviewed and formally
rejected NIR’s Notice of Exemption, giving substantial weight to
the fact that NIR had never engaged in common carrier operations
before and to a petition filed by the Village in opposition to the
exemption arguing, among other points, that NIR simply sought
to carry on the same waste processing as Metro Enviro Transfer
under the guise of another entity.45  NIR could then submit a full
application or a formal petition for exemption.46
Before NIR made any further application to the STB, the Vil-
lage began considering condemning the property, and using it for
municipal office space and as a storage lot for salt, sand, and mu-
nicipal vehicles.47  Pursuant to New York Eminent Domain Proce-
dure Law, a public hearing was held on February 6, 2006 and an
appraisal of the site established a fair acquisition price of five mil-
lion dollars.48
Before the Village made a decision whether or not to acquire
the property, BSR filed suit against the Village in federal court to
41. Metro Enviro Transfer, LLC, 833 N.E.2d at 1212.
42. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
43. Id. at 245.
44. Id. at 245.  Metro Enviro Transfer was not a rail carrier and therefore was not
under the jurisdiction of the STB.  Thus, it was not required to apply for the
exemption.
45. Northeast Interchange Ry., No. 34734, 2005 WL 3090145 (S.T.B. Nov. 17,
2005).
46. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 245.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 246.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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enjoin the eminent domain proceeding and to bar the enforcement
of any of the Village’s zoning regulations affecting the yard.49
BSR is a Class III rail carrier, as classified by the STB, that owns
a stretch of track near Buffalo, New York, and ships freight across
the state.50  After NIR abandoned its interest in the property,
Greentree Realty leased the property to RS Acquisitions Co.,
which, in turn, subleased the property to BSR in March 2006, un-
beknownst to the Village.51 Although, BSR began holding itself
out as a common carrier, offering transloading services on the
property, little activity took place before the suit was
commenced.52
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the applicant must show a
likelihood of “suffer[ing] irreparable injury if such relief is denied
. . . and a likelihood of success on the merits.”53  As for the first
requirement, the court reasoned that if the Village was allowed to
continue with the eminent domain proceeding, BSR would lose the
ability to conduct business in the yard and that would clearly con-
stitute irreparable harm.54
In regard to whether BSR would have a likelihood of success
on the merits if litigation were to commence, BSR argued that
under the ICCTA, any state or local regulation of a common car-
rier by rail would be preempted.55  Against the backdrop of Green
Mountain R.R. Corp., the court held that the Village zoning and
permit ordinances were preempted by the ICCTA.56  Further, the
court enjoined the Village from continuing in its eminent domain
proceeding against the site, stating, “the ICCTA has been held to
preempt eminent domain proceedings where the state action
would ‘prevent or unreasonably interfere with railroad opera-
tions.’”57  If the eminent domain proceeding commenced by the
Village were allowed to go forward, and the Village were allowed
to acquire the whole parcel, it would clearly interfere with BSR’s
operations.
49. Id. at 247.
50. Id. at 246. Class III rail carriers have annual revenues of under $20 million.
51. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 246.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 247.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 248.
56. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 248.
57. Id. (quoting Maumee & W. R.R. Corp., STB Fin. Docket No. 34354 (S.T.B.
Mar. 3, 2004)).
9
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The Village then argued that BSR was not a “rail carrier” as
defined in the ICCTA because it did not have a license to operate
as a common carrier out of the Croton-on-Hudson property.58
Under 49 U.S.C. § 10902(a), a Class III rail carrier, such as BSR,
“may acquire or operate an extended or additional rail line under
this section only if the Board issues a certificate authorizing such
activity.”  Because BSR had not obtained the authority from the
STB, it was not a “rail carrier” and its facility is not within the
jurisdiction of the STB.
BSR responded first by arguing that the illegality of its opera-
tions in Croton was irrelevant to the issue of ICCTA preemption
and, second, that it did not actually need to seek any certificate
from the STB before commencing operations under 49 U.S.C.
§ 10906, which states that the STB “does not have authority
under this chapter over construction, acquisition, operation, aban-
donment, or discontinuance or spur, industrial, team, switching or
side tracks.”59  BSR contends that its operations in Croton do not
include the extension or addition of rail lines, but rather the track
on the property is a “spur” track.60
The court rejected the Village’s assertion that BSR was not a
rail carrier because its local operations were illegal and concluded
that as long as BSR was legally providing rail carrier service
somewhere, then it was a rail carrier under the ICCTA.  It simply
was a rail carrier conducting illegal operations in an area where it
was not licensed to provide service.61  “Illegal operations by a rail
carrier do not preempt preemption.”62  Further evidence of Con-
gressional intent to secure jurisdiction over rail carriers, such as
BSR, is that the ICCTA contains remedies for violations, such as
operating without a license, as the Village contends BSR was
doing.63
The court granted BSR’s request for a preliminary injunction
upon the condition of BSR’s posting $100,000 bond and BSR’s con-
tinued refusal to accept solid waste material.64  On April 26, 2007,
BSR notified the STB that it was seeking to withdraw the Notice
of Exemption that it had filed in regard to its operations at the
58. Id. at 250.
59. Id. at 251.
60. Id.
61. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 252.
62. Id. at 253.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 256.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER108.txt unknown Seq: 11  6-MAR-09 13:08
2009] ICCTA PREEMPTION 299
Croton site.65  BSR cancelled its lease at the Croton property
sometime in 2007.66
This case made it clear to local authorities that if the facility
at the Croton train yard is leased by a rail carrier, there is no way
to prevent it from being used as a solid waste transfer station.
Furthermore, if the facility is to become a rail carrier-owned solid
waste transfer facility, the Village is preempted by the ICCTA
from imposing regulations on the transfer station.  As long as a
rail carrier operates the facility, the Village can only hope that
federal regulation of the facility covers some of its concerns.
IV. ANALYSIS
As in Buffalo Southern R.R., courts throughout the country
have interpreted section 10501 of the ICCTA to be an explicit
statement of congressional intent to preempt state and local zon-
ing and environmental regulations as applied to railroads and
their operations.67  Yet, all hope may not be lost for communities
seeking to regulate rail-owned facilities, as there are three ways
in which states and municipalities may retain some ability to reg-
ulate aspects of facility operation. First, states and municipalities
may continue to exercise traditional police powers.  The state of
New Jersey has effectively managed to exert control over rail-
owned solid waste transfer facilities through environmental regu-
lations promulgated by the New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection.  Second, litigation concerning the preemption
of state and local law by section 10501 of the ICCTA has not gone
unnoticed by the federal government.  In both the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, amendments to the ICCTA have been
proposed that would change the language of section 10501(b) by
removing solid waste transfer facilities from STB jurisdiction.  If
none of the legislation amending the ICCTA is passed, and if
states do not create regulations similar to those in New Jersey,
communities will find themselves unable to regulate the environ-
mental hazards posed by rail-operated solid waste transfer facili-
ties.  In this situation communities may benefit by the resolution
65. Buffalo S. R.R., STB Fin. Docket No. 34903 (S.T.B. June 6, 2007).
66. Railroad-Owned Solid Waste Transload Facilities: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials, 110th Cong. (2007) (state-
ment of Gregory J. Schmidt, Mayor, Vill. of Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.).
67. Accord City of Auburn v. United States, 154 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 1998); Green
Mountain R.R. Corp. v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 641 (2d Cir. 2005); Soo Line R. Co. v.
City of Minneapolis, 38 F.Supp. 2d 1096 (D.Minn. 1998).
11
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of sections 10501 and 10906 of the ICCTA, as they relate to STB
control over “spur tracks.”  The third part of this section will con-
sider court interpretations of these two sections and how a nar-
rower interpretation of the ICCTA preemption provision would
benefit communities seeking to regulate rail-owned facilities.
A. Exercise of State Policing Powers
Although section 10501 of the ICCTA preempts most state
and local attempts to regulate solid waste transfer stations owned
by railroads, local authorities may continue to exercise their
“traditional police powers” provided that: “the regulations protect
the public health and safety, are settled and defined, can be
obeyed with reasonable certainty, entail no extended or open-en-
ded delays and can be approved (or rejected) without the exercise
of discretion on subjective questions.”68  This includes “direct envi-
ronmental regulations enacted for the protection of public health
and safety,”69 so long as the regulations do not unreasonably in-
terfere with railroad operations.
New Jersey is an example of a state that has used its tradi-
tional police powers to successfully promulgate environmental
regulations for rail carriers that transfer solid waste.  Under sec-
tion 7:26-2D.1 of the New Jersey Administrative Code, the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) out-
lines solid waste requirements for rail carriers that transfer con-
tainerized or noncontainerized solid waste to or from rail cars.
The regulations, known as the 2D regulations, apply to rail carri-
ers that provide “common carrier railroad transportation for com-
pensation” as defined in the ICCTA at 49 U.S.C. § 10102(5).70  The
rail carrier must be approved by the STB pursuant to ICCTA sec-
tions 10901 and 10902 or have been otherwise recognized as a rail
carrier by the STB as holding itself out to “the general public that
the operations at the facility are being conducted by it or on its
behalf as part of its rail transportation services.”71
Once it has been established that the railroad fits the defini-
tion of a rail carrier that transfers solid waste to and from rail
cars, the rail carrier is then subject to the requirements of the reg-
ulations.  Rail carriers must provide the geographical location and
68. Green Mountain R.R. Corp v. Vermont, 404 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2005).
69. Id.
70. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26-2D.1(a) (2008).
71. Id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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the address of the facility to the NJDEP.72  Standards for rail car-
rier operation are broken down into two categories: one for carri-
ers that engage in the transportation of solid waste in sealed
containers, and one for those that engage in solid waste tipping,
processing, sorting or other transfer of solid waste from a
container to another container or vehicle.73  For rail carriers that
transport solid waste in sealed containers, the regulations provide
the duration of time that waste can remain at a facility, a prohibi-
tion on the migration of odors or air contaminants, fire fighting
and emergency procedures, regulation of noise levels, regulation
of solid waste vehicles including no queuing on public streets and
no traffic backups and hazards on access roads, and a requirement
that vehicles transporting to the site be registered pursuant to
N.J. Admin. Code section 7:26-3 with the Division of Solid and
Hazardous Waste.74  Rail carriers must keep a record of all waste
receipts, a summary of which is required to be submitted in a
quarterly report.75  Under section 7:26-2D.1(c)(2)(x), authorized
representatives and inspectors of the NJDEP reserve the right to
enter, observe, photograph, and sample at facilities in order to as-
certain compliance with the regulations.  The rail carrier is sub-
ject to penalties under the N.J. Solid Waste Management Act for
failure to comply with the 2D regulations.76
The 2D regulations provide similar provisions for rail carriers
transporting noncontainerized waste.77  The main difference be-
tween the standards for containerized and noncontainerized
waste is that the standards for noncontainerized waste provide re-
quirements to ensure the safe handling of waste within the facil-
ity.78  Rail carriers are also subject to N.J. Admin. Code section
7:26-1.10, requiring every solid waste facility holding a transfer
station to obtain a master performance permit in accordance with
procedures at section 7:26-2.4.
72. Id. § 7:26-2D.1(b).
73. Id. § 7:26-2D.1(c), (d).
74. Id. § 7:26-2D.1 (c).
75. Id. § 7:26-2D.1(c)(2)(xiii).
76. Id. § 7:26-2D.1(c)(2)(xiv).
77. Id. § 7:26-2D.1(d).
78. Id.  (standards specific to noncontainerized waste include, but are not limited
to concrete tipping floors to ensure the containment and channeling of wastewater,
section 7:26-2D.1(d)(2); daily cleaning of areas where waste is stored, section 7:26-
2D.1(d)(4); control of insect and rodents in compliance with the New Jersey Pesticide
Control Code, section 7:26-2D.1(d)(10)).
13
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Rail carriers operating solid waste transfer stations in New
Jersey were unhappy with the implementation of the 2D regula-
tions.  In New York Susquehanna and Western Ry. Corp. v. Jack-
son, New York Susquehanna and Western Railway Corporation
(Susquehanna) sued New Jersey state officials, contending that
the regulations pertaining to railroad carriers that transport solid
waste are preempted by the ICCTA.79  Susquehanna operates five
solid waste transfer facilities in New Jersey.80  New Jersey found
Susquehanna to be in violation of several standards in the 2D reg-
ulations, including not properly controlling dust migration or the
channeling of wastewater, spilling hazardous waste onto tracks
and adjoining areas, not properly controlling odor emissions, in-
sects and rodents, and failing to clean the facilities daily.81  Civil
penalties were assessed against Susquehanna at a rate of $2,000
per day per facility, totaling $2.5 million.82
In response to the civil penalty, Susquehanna sued the State
in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
claiming that the 2D regulations were preempted by the ICCTA
and asking that the State be enjoined from enforcing the pen-
alty.83  The district court held that the ICCTA preempts the 2D
regulations.84  On appeal, the Third Circuit held that the State’s
environmental regulation of the operation of the facility and the
power to enter and inspect the facility were not “per se unreasona-
ble” so as to compel preemption by the ICCTA.85  The court first
determined that Susquehanna’s operations fit the definitions of
“rail carrier” and “transportation,” so as to bring the railway
under the jurisdiction of the ICCTA.86  Based on determinations
made by the STB and prior court cases on the subject, the court
then stated that “a state law that affects rail carriage survives
preemption if it does not discriminate against rail carriage and
does not unreasonably burden rail carriage.”87 State regulations
do not discriminate against rail carriers if they “address state con-
79. New York Susquehanna & W. Ry. Corp. v. Jackson, 500 F.3d 238, 242 (3d Cir.
2007).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 245, 246.
82. Id. at 245.
83. Id. at 246.
84. 500 F.3d at 246.
85. Id. at 257.
86. Id. at 247-251 (This determination was made in response to the State’s argu-
ment that Susquehanna was not under the jurisdiction of the ICCTA and therefore
the preemption language of section 10501(b) did not apply.).
87. Id. at 254.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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cerns generally, without targeting the railroad industry.”88 A
state regulation is unreasonably burdensome if it “prevents the
railroad from carrying out its business in a sensible fashion.”89
The regulations “must be clear enough that the rail carrier can
follow them and that the state cannot easily use them as a pretext
for interfering with or curtailing rail service.”90 The regulations
promulgated by New Jersey were not per se unreasonable, but a
determination must be made on a regulation-by-regulation basis;
a determination to be made on remand to the district court and
not by the Third Circuit.91  The court noted specifically that it ap-
pears that many of the 2D regulations are more relaxed than
those applying to other solid waste facilities, “probably because
the State was trying to steer clear of a preemption problem.”92
Although the court did not make a decision as to whether all
of the 2D regulations were outside the scope of preemption, it did
suggest that many of the provisions might not be preempted.93
This is a positive outcome for communities in New Jersey seeking
protection from the environmental hazards associated with solid
waste transfer facilities.  Many of the provisions found in the 2D
regulations would help to deal with the concerns of the Village of
Croton-on-Hudson.  In his testimony to the House Subcommittee
on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials, Croton Mayor
Gregory J. Schmidt specifically mentioned the Village’s inability
to monitor the types of waste being trucked through the streets to
the facility and the lack of control over the use of an access road to
the facility that is shared with a 2,000-space commuter parking
lot.94  Regulations similar to those in New Jersey would deal with
these concerns, as they would require the rail carrier to maintain
daily records of waste received and report quarterly to an admin-
istrative agency of the State.  Vehicles transporting waste to the
facility would be prohibited from queuing on the access road,
which would prevent traffic backups.  Furthermore, fear of being
subject to monetary penalty for violation of the regulations would
help to ensure compliance.
88. Id.
89. 500 F.3d at 254.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 256.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Railroad-owned Solid Waste Transload Facilities Before the H. Subcomm. on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Gregory J. Schmidt, Mayor, Vill. of Croton-on-Hudson, N.Y.).
15
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Currently, New York does not have a specific set of regula-
tions applying to rail carriers that operate solid waste transfer fa-
cilities.  In New York solid waste transfer facilities are subject to
the same requirements as other solid waste facilities under the
rules and regulations of the Department of Environmental Con-
servation (NYDEC).95  Solid waste management facilities must
operate in accordance with a valid permit issued by the NYDEC
and must follow certain operational requirements.96  When an op-
erator of a solid waste transfer station is not a rail carrier, the
transfer station will be subject to the New York regulations.  A
rail carrier acting as the operator of a solid waste transfer facility
can claim preemption under the ICCTA, and be subject to federal
jurisdiction.  New York should create a set of regulations similar
to the 2D regulations in New Jersey to avoid the preemption of
section 10501(b) of the ICCTA.
The outcome of the Susquehanna case, as well as statements
made by Charles D. Nottingham, Chairman of the STB, suggest
that regulations such as those in New Jersey are a viable alterna-
tive for states that wish to retain some environmental control over
solid waste transfer facilities.  In his address to the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture’s Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous
Materials, Nottingham stated:
[I]t would be consistent with everything the Board has said
about the scope of the section 10501(b) preemption that states
can apply their regulations to rail-related waste facilities so
long as the regulations are not applied in a discriminatory man-
ner and the regulations do not unreasonably interfere with the
railroad’s right to conduct its operations. Therefore, I would not
object to New Jersey implementing its 2D regulations, or to
other states adopting and implementing similar regulations.97
States seeking to regulate the potential environmental
hazards of solid waste transfer facilities can carefully craft regula-
tions similar to the 2D regulations. If the regulations do not un-
reasonably interfere with a rail carrier’s ability to operate and do
95. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 360-11.1 (2008).
96. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 360-1.7 (2008).
97. Railroad-owned Solid Waste Transload Facilities Before the Subcomm. on
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Charles D. Nottingham, Chairman, Surface Transp. Board).
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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not discriminate against rail operation, they will likely survive ju-
dicial review, and the STB would approve them.
B. Proposed Federal Regulation
Litigation regarding ICCTA preemption of state and local reg-
ulation of solid waste transfer facilities has not gone unnoticed by
the House of Representatives and the Senate.  The most direct
way of ending the litigation and returning jurisdiction over rail
carrier-operated solid waste facilities to states and municipalities
is by amending section 10501(b) of the ICCTA.  During October
2007, the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastruc-
ture’s Subcommittee on Railroad, Pipelines, and Hazardous
Materials held hearings on railroad-owned solid waste transload
facilities.  Among those testifying were STB Chairman Charles
Nottingham, STB Commissioner Francis P. Mulvey, and Croton-
on-Hudson Mayor Gregory J. Schmidt.
While several bills have been proposed to modify the ICCTA,
none of them have been enacted into law.  On May 1, 2007, the
Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act of 2007 was introduced
in the House.  The purpose of the Federal Railroad Safety Im-
provement Act is to “amend title 49, United States Code, to pre-
vent railroad fatalities, injuries and hazardous materials releases,
to authorize the Federal Railroad Safety Administration, and for
other purposes.”98  Section 617 entitled “Surface Transportation
Board Jurisdiction Over Solid Waste Facilities” proposes to amend
section 10501(b) of the ICCTA by limiting jurisdiction to “facilities
(except solid waste rail transfer facilities as defined in subsection
(c)(3)(C)).”99  Solid waste rail transfer facilities would be defined
as “the portion of any facility owned or operated by or on behalf of
a rail carrier, at which occurs the (i) collection, storage, or trans-
fer, outside of original shipping containers; (ii) separation; or (iii)
processing (including baling, crushing, compacting, and shred-
ding) of solid waste, as defined in section 1004 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6903).”100  The amended subsection
(c)(3)(C) of section 10501would state “[n]othing in this section
preempts a State or local governmental authority from regulating
solid waste rail transfer facilities.”101  This bill has been passed in
the House of Representatives and received in the Senate as an act
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of the same title.102  It has been referred to the Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation.  The Senate version of
the proposed bill differs from that of the House in that the pro-
posed amendment to ICCTA section 10501 has different language.
The proposed changes in the Senate version are the same as those
proposed in the Clean Railroads Act of 2007.
In February 2007, the Clean Railroads Act was introduced in
both houses of Congress.  The sole purpose of this Act is to amend
section 10501 of the ICCTA, so as to exclude solid waste disposal
from the jurisdiction of the STB.103  Section 10501 is amended:
1) by striking ‘facilities,’ in subsection (b)(2) and inserting ‘facil-
ities (except solid waste management facilities (as defined in
section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. 6903))),’;
and
(2) by striking ‘over mass transportation provided by a local
governmental authority.’ in subsection (c)(2) and inserting
‘over—(A) mass transportation provided by a local governmen-
tal authority; or (B) the processing or sorting of solid waste.’
The proposed language of the Act limits the 10501(b) jurisdiction
of the STB to rail-operated facilities other than solid waste man-
agement facilities.  Under the current version of section
10501(c)(2), the STB does not have jurisdiction over mass trans-
portation that is provided by a local government authority.104  The
proposed amendment to section 10501(c)(2) would have the effect
of removing processing and sorting of waste in solid waste trans-
fer stations from the jurisdiction of the STB.105  This bill has been
referred to the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee and the House Transportation and Infrastructure’s
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines and Hazardous Materials.
The Federal Railroad Safety Improvement Act and the Clean
Railroads Act remove solid waste transfer stations from the juris-
diction of the ICCTA.  The difference in the proposed amendments
lies in their definitions of the term “solid waste transfer facility” or
“solid waste management facility.”  Under the Federal Railroad
Safety Improvement Act, the term “solid waste transfer facility” is
defined as including rail-owned facilities where waste is collected,
102. Id.
103. S. 719, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1248, 110th Cong. (2007).
104. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(c)(2).
105. S. 719, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1248, 110th Cong. (2007).
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/8
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stored or transferred “outside of original shipping containers.”106
By this definition, solid waste transfer facilities apply only to
those that transfer noncontainerized waste.107
Under the Clean Railroads Act, STB jurisdiction excludes
solid waste management facilities as defined in the Solid Waste
Disposal Act.  The Solid Waste Disposal Act defines solid waste
management facilities to include “any facility for the collection,
source separation, storage, transportation, transfer, processing,
treatment or disposal of solid wastes, including hazardous wastes,
whether such facility is associated with facilities generating such
wastes or otherwise.”108  This definition includes any facility that
transports or transfers solid waste and does not make the distinc-
tion that the waste must be outside of the original shipping con-
tainers.  Solid waste transfer stations that handle containerized
waste are included in this definition, making it broader and more
inclusive.
Municipalities where solid waste facilities are operated will
benefit from the passing of any of the proposed legislation.  The
Clean Railroads Act provides that states and municipalities have
jurisdiction over solid waste transfer stations that handle both
containerized and noncontainerized waste.109  This allocation of
jurisdiction will allow for localities to impose environmental regu-
lations on facilities that will help to ensure the safety and health
of their communities.
In addition to the above, proposed amendments, states and
municipalities may be afforded more immediate relief by a tempo-
rary law included in the FY 2008 Omnibus Appropriations Bill.
The bill, signed into law by President Bush in December 2007, in-
cludes the Lautenberg Law (named for Senator Frank R.
Lautenberg of New Jersey), a provision allowing states to deny
approval of solid waste facilities at rail sites for one year while
permanent legislation proceeds.110 The law will require STB to ef-
fectively get permission from states before approving any new fa-
cility or declaring any existing rail waste facility lawful to
106. H.R. 2095, 110th Cong. (2007).
107. Id.
108. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(29)(c) (2006).
109. S. 1889, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 719, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1248, 110th
Cong. (2007).
110. Press Release, Senator Lautenberg, Lautenberg Measure To Let States Regu-
late Waste Sites Along Rail Lines Becomes Law (Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://
lautenberg.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=290175&.
19
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operate.111 It applies to any STB permit issued in fiscal year
2008.112  This bill will be beneficial to communities that are faced
with the prospect of a solid waste transfer station opening within
2008.
Senator Charles E. Schumer of New York backed the tempo-
rary Lautenberg legislation and is a cosponsor of the Clear Rail-
roads Act.113  Schumer expressed his support for the temporary
provision to the Joint Senate-House Conference Committee,
stating:
It’s imperative that we include this provision so local communi-
ties in Croton and Middletown don’t see their quality of life
threatened by the rail companies trying to construct solid-waste
facilities under the radar. . . . Jurisdiction over siting solid
waste facilities should rest primarily with local and state au-
thorities because they are on the ground and are best able to
judge what [is] best for their community and region.  Firms
should not be able to hide behind the claim of federal preemp-
tion to avoid appropriate regulation when it comes to building
and operating solid waste facilities.114
Community concern over federal preemption of local regulation of
solid waste transfer facilities has not gone unnoticed.  Given the
support of local legislators, the several proposed amendments to
section 10501 of the ICCTA and the temporary measure in place,
it seems hopeful that a more permanent measure may be passed
into law.
C. Conflict between § 10906 and § 10501 and the term
“spur track”
If none of the permanent legislation amending the ICCTA is
passed, and if New York does not create regulations similar to the
2D regulations in New Jersey, Croton will remain in a position
where it has no control over the solid waste facility due to preemp-
tion by the ICCTA.  Further, an issue brought up, but not decided,
by the Buffalo Southern R.R. court may prove another concern:
whether or not the length of track at the facility is a side or spur
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Press Release, Senator Schumer, Schumer Backs Bill To Give Local Authori-
ties In Croton And Middletown The Power To Keep Solid-Waste Transfer Stations On
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track under ICCTA.  As stated above, section 10501(b)(2) of the
ICCTA gives the STB exclusive jurisdiction over side and spur
tracks.115  However, section 10906 of the ICCTA states that “[t]he
Board does not have authority under this chapter over construc-
tion, acquisition, operation, abandonment, or discontinuance of
spur, industrial, team, switching, or side tracks.”116  The STB has
jurisdiction over spur and side tracks, but does not have authority
over them, an odd result.  Not only will the Village be unable to
impose specific conditions on the facility, but the STB will not be
able to exercise environmental review or provide conditions in per-
mitting, as well.  The facility will then only be under environmen-
tal regulation of federal statutes.
The distinction between a railroad line and a spur track
“turns on the intended use of the track segment, not on the label
or cost of the segment.”117  Railroad lines, including main or
branch lines, are “lines designed and used for continuous trans-
portation service by through, full trains between different points
of shipment or travel.”118  Spur tracks are those “naturally and
necessarily designed and used for loading, unloading, switching,
and other purposes connected with, and incidental to, but not ac-
tually and directly used for, such transportation service.”119
Given these definitions of spur track and railroad line, the track in
the Croton train yard used by Buffalo Southern R.R. is a spur
track.  The 1600-foot track is not used for continuous transporta-
tion, as it is a dead-end, and is designed to be used for loading and
unloading from the facility located in the rail yard.120
In 1999, the Seventh Circuit decided the case of United
Transp. Union-Illinois Legislative Bd. v. Surface Transp. Bd., in
which Union argued that because section 10906 of the ICCTA
states that the STB has no authority over spur tracks, it therefore
has no jurisdiction over spur tracks.121  Union attempted to argue
that the STB’s determination that a section of rail is a spur track
is not entitled to Chevron deference because the STB has no au-
115. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)(2).
116. Id. § 10906.
117. Nicholson v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 711 F.2d 364, 367 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
118. Id. (quoting Detroit & M. Ry. v. Boyne City, G. & A.R.R., 286 F. 540, 546
(E.D.Mich. 1923)).
119. Id.
120. Buffalo S. R.R., 434 F. Supp. 2d at 244.
121. United Transp. Union-Illinois Legislative Bd. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 183 F.3d
606 (7th Cir. 1999).
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thority over spur tracks and therefore lacks jurisdiction.122  The
court held that the “unambiguous statutory language” of section
10501(b)(2) states that the STB does have jurisdiction over spur
tracks.123  The court stated that “[s]tatutory provisions are to be
interpreted to be consistent with one another.  It is unreasonable
to interpret one provision as eliminating another unless the lan-
guage requires it.”124  The STB’s authority to authorize the con-
struction and operation of rail lines does not apply to spur tracks,
although the Board still has jurisdiction.125
The holding in Union, although a clear statutory interpreta-
tion, still provides no relief to communities concerned about opera-
tions on spur tracks in their municipalities.  Facilities under the
jurisdiction of the STB, but not under its authority, are still sub-
ject to federal environmental statutes, but there is a gap when it
comes to local concerns.  This could be dealt with by giving the
STB authority over the spur tracks, which will at least provide for
STB environmental review, and the possible imposition of require-
ments and conditions in licenses.  The second, and more favorable
option, would be to remove facilities located on spur tracks from
STB jurisdiction, either by amending the ICCTA (as written about
above), or by following the footsteps of courts that have read the
ICCTA preemption more narrowly.
In the article Who’s Driving the Train? Railroad Regulation
and Local Control, the author suggests courts use an “economi-
cally integral” test to determine if rail-owned facilities are under
STB jurisdiction.126  Essentially, the test asks whether the local
regulation impacts the rail carrier in “an economically meaningful
way.”127  If it does, then the law is preempted by the ICCTA.128
However, if the regulation does not impact the rail carrier in an
economically meaningful way, it is not preempted by the




126. Maureen E. Eldredge, Who’s Driving the Train? Railroad Regulation and Lo-
cal Control, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 549, 583 (2004).  Eldredge cites the 11th Circuit case,
Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1327 (11th Cir.
2001), and the Vermont state court case of In re Appeal of Vermont Railway, 769 A.2d
648 (Vt. 2000) as examples of the “economically integral” approach to determining
whether the ICCTA preempts state and local regulation.  In both cases, the court
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ICCTA.129  This narrower preemption is based on courts interpre-
tation of the preemption language of ICCTA section 10501 in light
of congressional intent “to free the railroad industry from eco-
nomic impediments.”130
In the case of Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. City of West Palm
Beach, the court used the “economically integral” test to find that
the City’s regulation of an aggregate distribution business oper-
ated by the lessee of the railway was not subject to ICCTA pre-
emption.131  The court began its reasoning by acknowledging that
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution there exists a ba-
sic assumption against preemption in fields of law where states
have traditionally exerted their police powers.132  Historically, lo-
cal governments have dictated the use of property in their geo-
graphical limits by zoning regulations, therefore entitling the
City’s ordinances to a presumption of validity.133  The court looked
at the express preemption language of section 10501 of the ICCTA
and noted that the provision does not apply to “all other law.”134
In fact, the “express pre-emption applies only to state laws ‘with
respect to regulation of rail transportation.’”135  The court reached
the holding of the case, as stated above, by interpreting the mean-
ing of “with respect to regulation of rail transportation,” in light of
the definitions provided in the ICCTA and the legislative history
of the Act, which focuses on “removing direct economic regulation
by the states, as opposed to the incidental effects that inhere in
the exercise of traditionally local police powers such as zoning the
regulating economic impacts of the railroad industry.”136 The zon-
ing ordinances of the City, which the court found to be entitled to
an assumption of validity under the Supremacy Clause, “do not
frustrate the objectives of federal railroad policy” and are not pre-
empted by the ICCTA.137
Although the “economically integral” test may help to narrow
the scope of preemption, it is a fact-based determination that may
not always result in the decision most favorable to the environ-
129. Id.
130. Id. at 587.
131. Florida East Coast Ry. Co. v. City of West Palm Beach, 266 F.3d 1324, 1327
(11th Cir. 2001)
132. Id. at 1327-28.
133. Id. at 1329.
134. Id. at 1331.
135. Id. at 1331 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b)).
136. Florida East Cost Ry. Co., 266 F.3d at 1337.
137. Id. at 1339.
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ment or health of a community.  Applying the test to the Village of
Croton-on-Hudson’s dilemma is a good example.  In Buffalo
Southern R.R., the rail carrier sought to enjoin the Village from
commencing an eminent domain proceeding on the property.  The
Village’s eminent domain proceeding would surely be preempted
by the ICCTA.  Eminent domain would strip the rail carrier of its
property and its business, and would cause a tremendous eco-
nomic harm.  This would not classify as an “incidental” economic
effect.  However, conditions such as those specified in the special
permit to Metro Enviro Transfer are less likely to be considered
economically meaningful.  Permit requirements specifying the
reasonable hours of operation, prohibiting queuing of trucks on ac-
cess roads and regulating noise levels might all be considered to
have an incidental economic effects on a rail-carrier’s waste trans-
fer operations, but these permit requirements will not cause the
business to fail or significantly impact the operations.  In requir-
ing these permit conditions the Village is not regulating the opera-
tion of a railroad, so much as it is acting within its police powers
in an effort to protect the safety and health of the community from
the possible dangers associated with the operations of a waste
transfer station.
As stated above, one of the major concerns of the Village is
that it will not be able to control the vehicles bringing waste
through the town streets.  In In re Vermont Railway, the Vermont
Supreme Court upheld a decision of the lower court allowing the
City of Burlington to impose certain permitting conditions on a
salt shed facility operated by the Vermont Railway.138  In distin-
guishing between permit conditions that are not preempted by the
ICCTA and those that are, the court stated that a line is drawn
between “conditions that [are] purported to regulate the operation
of the railroad, including the transport of goods by the railway,
and conditions that merely regulated activity regarding motor ve-
hicles coming and going from the facility and the storage of mater-
ials at the facility.”139  According to the Vermont Supreme Court,
conditions not preempted under the ICCTA include those that
control the routing of trucks leaving the facility, the number of
trucks exiting the facility on a daily basis, the hours at which
trucking can occur, parking at the facility, and “conditions de-
signed to avert potential contamination from the salt shed such as
138. In re Appeal of Vermont Ry., 769 A.2d 648 (Vt. 2000).
139. Id. at 655.
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. . . requirements that salt be handled on impervious surfaces.”140
Application of conditions such as those listed above would help to
assuage some of the fears the Village of Croton-on-Hudson has
concerning the trucking of solid waste through its streets.
In cases where a section of track has been determined to be a
spur track, a narrow interpretation of preemption under ICCTA
section 10501 is essential to allowing a municipality or state to
exercise its traditional police powers.  The narrow interpretation
of the “economically integral” test can erase the regulatory gap
that exists under ICCTA sections 10501 and 10906 by opening fa-
cilities owned by railroads to regulation by municipalities.  If the
courts do not use a narrower interpretation of ICCTA preemption,
facilities located along spur tracks will be left under the jurisdic-
tion of the STB, but under the authority of neither the STB nor
the municipality.
V. CONCLUSION
The outcome of Buffalo Southern R.R. produced a result with
possible negative environmental ramifications for the Village of
Croton-on-Hudson and its citizens.  No longer able to control the
kinds of waste or the way in which that waste is transported
through the town, the community is now open to the threat of real
environmental danger.  Croton is not the only municipality deal-
ing with this issue; it has become an important issue in other
states and for the federal government.
There are several ways in which the issue of preemption
under the ICCTA can be resolved in favor of state and local regu-
lation of solid waste transfer facilities.  First, states can use their
traditional police powers to promulgate environmental regula-
tions specifically tailored to avoid ICCTA preemption.  These reg-
ulations must not discriminate against rail carriers and must not
be unreasonably burdensome.  New Jersey’s 2D regulations pro-
vide a good example of standards enacted to protect the health
and welfare of communities that are sufficiently narrow in scope
so as to avoid preemption.  Second, communities seeking the abil-
ity to control solid waste facilities must express their concerns to
their congressional representatives.  Although a temporary fed-
eral law is in place, the best possible outcome will be achieved by
the passing of one of the proposed amendments to 49 U.S.C.
§ 10501.  A clear amendment to the law by the federal government
140. Id.
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will return jurisdiction over solid waste facilities to the municipal-
ities where they are located and will prevent further litigation on
the subject.  Third, a narrower interpretation of section 10501 of
the ICCTA will avoid a regulatory gap created by section 10906.
This narrower interpretation will allow municipalities to exert
control over solid waste facilities in situations where the STB does
not have authority.
It is imperative that either federal or state legislatures take
action in regards to the preemption provision of the ICCTA.  The
environment and the health of communities depend upon it.
ADDENDUM- SOME GOOD NEWS
In the time between writing this comment and publication,
President George W. Bush signed into law the Railroad Safety En-
hancement Act of 2008 on October 16, 2008.  The Railroad Safety
Enhancement Act amends the ICCTA section 10501 by providing
in subsection (c)(2) that the STB does not have jurisdiction over
solid waste transfer facilities as defined in section 10908 of the
ICCTA.141  Section 10908 further specifies that rail transfer
facilities:
shall be subject to and shall comply with all applicable Federal
and State requirements, both substantive and procedural, in-
cluding judicial and administrative orders and fines, respecting
the prevention and abatement of pollution, the protection and
restoration of the environment, and the protection of public
health and safety, including laws governing solid waste, to the
same extent as required for any similar solid waste manage-
ment facility.142
Rail carrier-owned waste transfer facilities will now have to
comply with state laws and will be required to seek state approv-
als to operate.143  Although the new law allows the STB to provide
a land-use exemption where it finds that a state or municipal law
unreasonably burdens interstate commerce or discriminates
against rail carrier-operated waste transfer stations, the law
places a much greater degree of control over siting and operation
of these facilities in the hands of the states.144  In taking rail car-
rier-owned solid waste transfer facilities out of STB jurisdiction
141. 49 U.S.C. § 10501(c)(2) (2008).
142. 49 U.S.C. § 10908(a) (2008).
143. Id. § 10908(b)(1), (2).
144. 49 U.S.C. § 10909(a)(1) (2008).
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and subjecting them to the same requirements as non-rail carrier-
owned facilities, the new law brings regulation of these facilities
one step closer to local government influence.  Communities, like
Croton-on-Hudson, will have a new, more accessible forum in
which to express their concerns and have their voices heard when
it comes to the citing and operation of waste transfer stations.
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